Research ReportMobile Money Fraud: Control Patterns That Hold
How fraud actually enters mobile money and agent-banking platforms — social engineering, SIM swap, agent collusion, API abuse — and the control patterns that stand up to each.
Security that keeps pace with a weekly release cycle — API and mobile testing in your pipeline, fraud-path review on your rails, and the control evidence your licensing and partner due diligence demand.

Security that moves at product speed.
FinTech security fails in a distinctive way. The cryptography is usually sound, the infrastructure is usually modern, and the losses still happen — through business logic, through the human edges of the product, and through partner integrations that inherited trust nobody re-examined.
That shapes how we test. Assessments that stop at the mobile application and the public API surface return a short list of low-severity findings and miss the money. The tests that find real exposure target transaction state machines under concurrent requests, authorisation checks on every step rather than the first, reversal and refund flows, agent and support tooling, and each partner credential as its own tenant.
We also work at your cadence. A security assessment delivered as a PDF six weeks after a release is archaeology. Automated checks in the pipeline, a short feedback loop on design decisions, and a standing channel for the questions that come up mid-sprint are worth more than an annual engagement.
The highest-impact findings in our FinTech work are almost never injection or misconfiguration. They are step-skipping in multi-stage flows, authorisation checked once at the start, race conditions on balance operations, and refund or reversal paths that can be driven backwards.
Where a one-time passcode arrives by SMS, control of the number is control of the account — and SIM re-issue sits with the mobile operator, not with you. Device binding changes the economics; better prompt wording does not.
Every integration extends your trust boundary. Credentials scoped far wider than the partner’s use case, no per-partner rate limit or anomaly baseline, and no way to revoke one partner without an outage for all is the recurring configuration.
Agent fraud is invisible transaction by transaction and obvious in the pattern — reversal rates outside the peer distribution, float movements that do not match customer activity, registration clusters sharing a device.
Keys committed to repositories, embedded in mobile binaries, or left in build logs remain one of the fastest routes into a FinTech environment, and one of the easiest to close with pipeline scanning and a broker pattern.
Fast-moving infrastructure produces publicly readable object storage, over-broad roles and forgotten proof-of-concept accounts. Continuous configuration monitoring with alerting on change catches these; an annual review does not.
The sequence below is what a fintech engagement looks like in practice — shaped by what your environment can and cannot tolerate.
Talk to our FinTech teamWe integrate dependency, secret and infrastructure-as-code scanning into your pipeline so the cheap findings are caught at pull-request time, and reserve manual testing for the business logic no scanner understands.
We walk your product’s money paths looking for how value leaves without authorisation — including the customer-service, agent and partner processes that sit outside the codebase entirely.
A thirty-minute conversation about an authentication design before it ships prevents a finding that would otherwise take a sprint to unpick. Retainer clients use us this way more than for formal testing.
Bank partners, card schemes and regulators all ask for control evidence. We produce it in the form each actually accepts, and sit in the follow-up calls where the questions get specific.
Each of these is a published instrument you can read. We map findings to them directly, so an assessment feeds your audit and supervisory cycle instead of sitting beside it.
Research ReportHow fraud actually enters mobile money and agent-banking platforms — social engineering, SIM swap, agent collusion, API abuse — and the control patterns that stand up to each.
Research ReportA practical threat model for systems where a language model can take actions — tool access, prompt injection, credential scope, and the audit trail you will wish you had.
Threat AdvisoryObject storage left world-readable remains one of the most common causes of data exposure we find. The detection and prevention controls are inexpensive and rarely switched on.